Recently, Wu-Chieu proposed an efficient and friendly remote authentication scheme with smart card. This scheme is very elaborate since no password table in the remote system, and could keep as well as low communication and low computation costs.
Introduction
At present, if we desires any service, we just remote login to a server which provides the service. The password authentication schemes are the well known and the most accepted mechanisms. These schemes use the correct password to authenticate the right user who wants to login the system. Only a legal user who has registered in system with corresponding password can use the system resources.
There are varieties of the password remote authentication schemes with smart card [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . These schemes can allow a legal user to login the remote system with his/her password and identity. In 2000, Sun proposed a scheme which authenticates user's validity without storing a password table and ensures the low communication and low computation [9] . However, Sun's method was not friendly, the fixed and unknown password could not satisfy user's request. Then, Wu and Chieu proposed an improved scheme in 2003 [11] . Their scheme allows users to choose a password randomly.
In this article, it is pointed out that Wu-Chieu's scheme could not withstand forge attack. An attacker can login the remote system without knowing anyone's password.
Wu-Chieu's scheme
There are three phases in this scheme: registration phase, login phase, and authentication phase. The following is the brief description of each phase.
Registration phase:
Firstly, a user submitted his/her identity ID i and a chosen password pw i to the system through a secure channel. Then, the system performs the following steps:
, where x is a secret key of the system and h(.) is a one-way hash function. 
Login phase:
When a user wants to login the system, he/she must insert his/her smart card into a device. Then, the user keys in his/her ID i and pw i , and the input device with smart card will perform the following steps: 
Authentication phase:
After received the message m, the system performs the following steps to verify the user's identity.

Step 1: Check the format of the ID i . If the format is not correct, the login request will be rejected.
 Step 2: Verify the validity of the time interval between T and T'. If (T' -T) ≧ ∆T
where the ∆T is the expected valid time interval for transmission delay, then the login request will be rejected. C . If they are equal, the system accepts the login request.
Attacks on Wu-Chieu's scheme
In this section, we show that Wu-Chieu's scheme cannot withstand a masquerade attack. In this scheme, an illegal user could login the server without obtain any password.
We suppose that an attacker wants to login a remote server. He performs the following steps before goes into the authentication phase, and he will login the remote server successfully.

Step 1: The attacker forges an ID i with applicable format or tries to obtain a legal user's ID i by using any way, such as intercepting from the network flows. C , so this step is satisfied.
Therefore, the remote system will accept the login request, because the attacker could pass through the all authentication checks of the system.
Conclusion
In this study, we have shown that Wu-Chieu's scheme is not secure. We forge the B i , and it's could be approved by the system authentication phase. In the future, if we want to develop a remote authentication scheme with smart card, we should achieve the following two goals in order to guarantee the security.
1. When a user's smart card is lost, he/she will not worry about the information which are stored in the smart card would be divulge.
2. The smart card could store the user's password. When a user wants to login a remote system, he/she must have the correct password to use this smart card.
